We consider the robust optimal control of a law of large numbers approximation of a stochastic network. The robust control problem is formulated as a di®erential game, with one player choosing the policies that determine service and routing assignments, and the other choosing quantities such as the arrival and service rates, subject to constraints. The cost to be minimized by the¯rst player and maximized by the second is the time till the origin is reached. An explicit formula is given for the value function, and some of its basic properties are studied.
Introduction
This paper considers the problem of robust service and routing control for a network of servers. Consider such a network, and assume that at each station there are a¯nite number of distinct customer classes, each with its own bu®er. In this paper we will work directly with what is sometimes called a \°uid" model for the network [16] . Models of this sort are usually obtained as law of large numbers approximations to more detailed models [5, 15] , and are particularly appealing because in many cases related optimization problems admit closed form solutions [20, 21, 11] .
Another feature of the networks we consider is model uncertainty, such as uncertainty in the arrival and service rates. To deal with model uncertainty we adapt the di®erential game formulation of robust control for . WORK UNIT NUMBER
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unconstrained nonlinear systems [14] . Thus we consider a network where there are two players. One player in the game will represent the \true" control (e.g., service assignments and routing decisions). The other player represents the uncertain or poorly modeled aspects of the system (e.g., arrival and service rates). In keeping with existing convention, we will refer to this latter control as \nature." The two players are antagonistic, with thē rst player attempting to maintain good system performance. Di®erential game formulations provide a powerful tool for the design of robust controls [3, 14] . In many situations knowledge of the true system is limited. System parameters (e.g., arrival rates) may drift with time, and statistical properties (e.g., correlations) may also be unstable. There may be aspects of the system that are left unmodeled, either because they cannot be estimated in any reliable way, or because they lead to a model that is too complicated to be useful. This is a common occurence in stochastic networks, where the network to be controlled is often a sub-network of some larger system, and \full state information" is simply not available to the controller of the sub-network.
In situations like these the use of a single \nominal" model can be problematic. For example, just as in the case of unconstrained systems one can construct examples where controls that are optimal in some sense for the nominal model perform poorly when the model is perturbed even slightly. A di®erential game formulation allows one to contruct controls that perform uniformly well over a class of perturbations of the nominal model, with each choice of nature's control corresponding to a di®erent perturbation of the design model. It is, of course, this insensitivity to model perturbations that warrants the term \robust" control. Variations of di®erent kinds can be accomodated through the choice of the cost structure, and one can carefully balance the pursuit of optimality with respect to a nominal model against the need to provide good performance for a range of models. The main result of this paper is the explicit solution to a robust control problem for a network. By explicit what we mean is that the value function can be represented in terms of a¯nite dimensional optimization problem, and that from this value function one can obtain controls with speci¯c robust properties.
In formulating the di®erential game special attention must be paid to the cost applied to nature's control, since this determines the degree to which model perturbations are allowed. Within the realm of \°uid" models there are at least two types of cost structures that are natural. One is a cost that simply imposes a constraint on the model parameters. We will refer to this as the case of a \hard constraint." An alternative is to make nature pay an increasing cost for perturbations away from the nominal model, and we will refer to this type of cost as corresponding to \soft constraints." Hard constraints turn out to be mathematically simpler for°uid models of networks, even though the reverse seems to be true for unconstrained systems. In the present paper we will focus on the case of hard constraints, and defer the case of soft constraints to future work.
Besides the cost that nature must pay, one must also specify the cost that the true control faces. In this paper the cost we consider is the time to move the state of the system from an arbitrary position to zero (i.e., all queues empty). The true control will try to minimize this time, while the opposing control will attempt to delay it as much as possible. This cost seems to be a natural analogue, in the setting of constrained systems, of the familiar quadratic cost for unconstrained systems. In particular, it leads to controls with optimal robust stability (in addition to optimal robust performance), and it also allows for a fairly explicit closed form solution.
An outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we give a precise formulation of the game problem, and show through examples how various systems can be put into this framework. Sections 3 includes the main result of the paper, which is a¯nite dimensional max/min representation for the value function of the game introduced in Section 2. Qualitative properties of the value function (convexity, di®erentiability, etc.) are also discussed in Section 3. The proof of this representation is given in Section 4. The concluding Section 5 formally discusses how an optimal true control can be constructed in feedback form. A proof of the existence of value for the games we consider is given in an Appendix.
Formulation of the Control Problem
In this section we formulate the robust control problem as a constrained deterministic di®erential game. As discussed in the introduction, the model we use can be viewed as a law of large numbers approximation to a more detailed stochastic model. This connection will be used for interpretive purposes throughout the section. The state space of the process is IR N + , and one can interpret each of the components as a queue length associated with a speci¯c customer class.
The formulation of the model involves two collections of N ¡dimensional vectors. The¯rst are the directions of constraint, which we designate by fd i ; i = 1; :::; N g. These vectors are used to de¯ne the Skorokhod or re°ec-tion map, which properly corrects the dynamics of the model when one or more components of the state are zero (i.e., one or more customer classes are empty). The second collection is designated fv jk ; j = 1; :::; J; k = 1; :::; Kg, and is used to de¯ne the dynamics of the system away from the boundary. Nature's control takes values in a compact convex set A ½ IR K , and the index j 2 f1; :::; Jg corresponds to one of the possible \pure" service/routing con¯gurations the true controller can select (illustrative examples will be given below). If nature chooses the control ® 2 A and the true control is the pure con¯guration j, then the quantity P K k=1 ® k v jk characterizes the (law of large numbers) evolution of the network when the state of the network is away from @IR N + . More general service/routing policies can be obtained by considering convex combinations of the pure controls, in which case the velocity of the system is given by
where
x 2 IR J : x j¸0 ; j = 1; :::; J;
and ½ j is the fraction of time allocated to the pure con¯guration j. We will assume the following condition on the directions of constraint. The condition is by now classical in the study of approximations to queueing networks, and is called the Harrison-Reiman condition in [10] . It was¯rst used in [13] . Although the Harrison-Reiman condition is usually associated with single class networks, it also de¯nes the proper Skorokhod Problem for many formulations of controlled multiclass networks as well. Note that the condition is the original Harrison-Reiman condition, and not the generalization that is also studied in [10] .
Condition 2.1 For each i 2 f1; :::; N g
Let D be the matrix whose ith column is d i . Then the spectral radius of I ¡ D is less than 1.
The following simple examples illustrate the role these di®erent quantities play. The ith unit basis vector is denoted by e i . Some of the most di±cult aspects in the control of networks are due to feedback and the interactions between di®erent servers. >From this perspective, the¯rst two examples are too simple to be of great interest. Also, it should be noted that the game formulation we consider in this paper only allows routing at the \fringes" of the network, and not between nodes. We hope to consider the more general routing problem in future work. Example 1. The¯rst example is a simple routing control problem. The rate of arrivals to the router is¸(t), and the service rates of the two servers are ¹ 1 (t) and ¹ 2 (t), respectively. The system is illustrated in Figure 1 . This model is put into the framework described above by setting
The choice of A determines the uncertainties and perturbations against which the optimal true control will be robust. For example, if the nominal service and arrival rates are 1 = 1 and ¹ ¹ i = 1; i = 1; 2, and if the service rates are well modeled and the arrival rate less so, then one might consider a set of the form This model is very simple, and perhaps too simple to capture any \proba-bilistic" intuition. For example, there is no constraint on combinations of ¹ 1 and ¹ 2 . >From a probabilistic perspective one might imagine that it is less likely that both of these parameters would equal their minimum value at the same time. The introduction of a constraint to account for this would lead to a set A with a \curved" boundary. One might also wish to consider an increasing family of sets A(c) indexed by c 2 [0; 1), and with A(0) just the nominal model. The largest c such that a certain robust performance measure can be met (e.g.,¯niteness of the value function) is an important quantity. In particular, it characterizes the control that is most robust, where the sense of robustness is determined by the shape of A and the relative uncertainty it assigns to di®erent aspects of the network.
We return our consideration to the particular example of Figure 1 . If a service is attempted at server 1 and the queue is empty then the proper compensating action is simply to return queue 1 to the level zero. As a consequence, the direction of constraint for the corresponding face is just d 1 = (1; 0). A corresponding remark applies to queue 2. The Skorokhod Problem for this is the same as that for Example 1. This model is put into the standard framework by setting
Example 3. This example considers a network of servers, and as a consequence the associated Skorokhod Map is more involved. The network is illustrated in Figure 3 . Since there are 6 customer classes the domain is IR 6 + . Suppose the service rate for class i is ¹ i (t) and the arrival rate is¸(t). 
while v j1 = v j4 = v j6 = 0. The velocity of the network under this con¯gu-ration is
If a service is attempted for say customer class i = 3 and the queue is empty, then queue 3 must be returned to zero and in addition queue 4 must be reduced by the same amount. Consequently, the proper direction of constraint for face i = 3 is d 3 = (e 3 ¡ e 4 ). Analogous considerations can be used to identify all other directions of constraint.
Example 4. In some problems there is randomized (uncontrolled) routing. For example, after service a fraction µ j of the class i customers may become class j customers, and a fraction µ 0 = 1 ¡ P J j=1;j6 =i µ j of the customers could leave the system. Let (d i ) j = ¡µ j if j 6 = i and (d i ) i = 1. Then the direction of constraint is d i on the face fx 2 IR N + : x i = 0g, and the reason is the same as in the last case: compensating for a \¯ctitous" service of a customer of class i requires a boost to coordinate i and a corresponding decrease in coordinate j with constant of proportionality µ j [18] .
To formulate the robust control problem we must specify the dynamics.
is the usual space of continuous functions with the sup norm metric, and suppose that a set of vectors that satisfy Condition 2.1 is given. For each point x on the boundary of IR 
There exists a Borel measurable function°:
, and such that
Note that´changes only when Á is on the boundary, and only in the directions d(Á).
Under Condition 2.1 the Skorokhod Problem has a solution for all Ã 2 C + ([0; 1) : IR N ). In addition, the mapping Ã ! Á is Lipschitz continuous [8, 13] .
We next de¯ne a constrained ordinary di®erential equation. As is proved in [8] , one can de¯ne a projection ¼ : 
For details on why this limit is always well de¯ned and further properties of the projected velocity we refer to [6, Section 3 and Lemma 3.8] and [7] . The dynamical model for the game we consider is then given by
and for all t 2 [0; 1) the true control ½(t) takes values in the set S and nature's control ®(t) takes values in the set A. According to the Skorokhod Problem, the velocity F (½; ®) governs the evolution of the network when all states are positive. When one or more states are negative, the projection of the velocity provides the proper correction to the dynamics due to nonnegativity constraints. An absolutely continuous function Á : [0; 1) ! IR N + is a solution to (2) if the equation is satis¯ed in an a.e. sense in t. By using the regularity properties of the associated Skorokhod Map, one can prove that all the standard qualitative properties (existence and uniqueness of solutions, stability with respect to perturbations, etc.) hold [8] . In fact, because of the particularly simple nature of the right hand side (i.e., ¼(Á(t);¯(t)) rather than ¼(Á(t); b(Á(t)) +¯(t)) for some function b), one can show that Á solves (2) if and only if Á is the image of Ã(t) : = R t 0 F (½(s); ®(s))ds + x under the Skorokhod Map, in which case all such issues become trivial [8] .
The ODE (2) de¯nes the dynamics for the game that we will consider. The cost we consider is the time for the state to reach the origin, which the true control will attempt to minimize and which nature will try to prolong. As usual in di®erential games, one must deal with the issue of which player has the \information advantage" [12] . For the problems we consider it will always turn out that the game has value, and so the value function will be the same regardless of who has the information advantage.
We use the standard Elliot-Kalton formulation of the game. De¯ne the spaces of (open loop) controls
We identify any two controls that are equal almost everywhere. Given x 2 IR N + , the dynamics of the game are given by (2) and (3). Associated with these dynamics is the cost
where ¿ x : = infft¸0 : Á(t) = 0g. A mapping µ : N ! M is said to be a strategy for the maximizing player if for each s¸0 and ½;1 2 N ½(t) =1(t) for a.e. 0 · t · s
A strategy for the minimizing player, which will be denoted by ±, is de¯ned in an analogous manner. We denote by £ the set of all maximizing strategies and by ¢ the set of all minimizing ones. The lower value of the game and the upper value of the game are de¯ned by
and
respectively. If V ¡ (x) = V + (x), then the game is said to have value. Let V : IR N ! IR. For points x 2 IR N and directions w 2 IR N for which the limit exists, we let D w V (x) denote the directional derivative in direction w at x:
We say that V is radially linear if V (ax) = aV (x) for all x 2 IR N and a 2 [0; 1).
Representation for the Value Function
For V + (x) and V ¡ (x) to be¯nite we will need some conditions. De¯ne the convex cone
which is the negative of the cone of constraint directions that are allowed at the origin. As observed in [6] , this cone can be used to characterize stability conditions for (2).
The following formula gives an explicit representation for the value of the game de¯ned in the last section. The precise statement is given at the end of the section, and the proof is given in Section 4. Recall that F (½; ®) :
We will also make use of
The following condition is necessary and su±cient for W (x) to be¯nite for all x 2 IR N . Let C ± denote the interior of C.
Condition 3.1 For each ® 2 A there exists ½ 2 S such that
It follows directly from the de¯nition of W ® (x) that under this condition W ® (x) < 1 for all x 2 IR N . Since A is compact, an open covering argument can be used to prove that W (x) < 1 for all x 2 IR N . In order to motivate the representation (6), we¯rst consider (7). In this case there is just \true" control for a¯xed set of arrival and service rates. It turns out that W ® equals the minimum time for a control problem that uses the dynamics de¯ned by the Skorokhod Problem and stops when the origin is reached. However, from the formula for W ® it is clear that W ® equals the solution to the minimum time problem with the much simpler dynamics _ Á(t) = F (½(t); ®) and the stopping set C. Away from the boundary @IR N + these two di®erent minimum time problems should satisfy the same Hamilton-Jacobi Bellman equation. Here only one boundary condition holds in the classical sense, and this is due to the fact that at the other boundary v points into the interior and away from this boundary. One of the important properties of viscosity solutions is that they allow such relaxations.
The remarkable fact is that an analogous representation continues to hold even in the game problem, with simply an additional supremization on ® 2 A. It should be noted that even though the game has value, one cannot permute the inf ½2S and sup ®2A in (6) .
In the rest of this section we will prove qualitative properties of W that are needed for the proof that W is the value of the game. 
N and ® 2 A by (7). The following conclusions hold.
1. W ® is¯nite and radially linear on IR N .
For each x 2 IR
N the in¯mum in (7) is achieved at some probability vector ½.
Proof: Under Condition 3.1 it is obvious that the cone C can be reached from any starting point x, and so W ® (x) < 1, while radially linearity is an immediate consequence of the de¯nition of W ® (x). It follows from the compactness of S that the in¯mum is achieved in the de¯nition of W ® (x). Thus the proofs of parts 1 and 2 are complete. To prove property 3 we¯rst consider points x 1 and x 2 such that W ® (x 1 ) = W ® (x 2 ) 6 = 0. Let c denote the common value, and let ½ 1 and ½ 2 denote minimizing probability vectors in the expression that de¯nes W ® (x 1 ) and W ® (x 2 ), respectively. Thus x i + cF (½ i ; ®) 2 @C for i = 1; 2. For s 2 [0; 1], the convexity of C implies
Since s½ 1 + (1 ¡ s)½ 2 2 S, it follows that
We next consider the case of any points x 1 and x 2 such that W ® (x 1 ) 6 = 0 and W ® (x 2 ) 6 = 0. Let
Since W ® is radially homogeneous,
The case where W ® (x 1 ) or W ® (x 2 ) equals zero is similar and omitted. 
W is convex on IR
Proof: It follows from Condition 3.1 that for each x 2 IR N W ® (x) is bounded uniformly in ® 2 A. All the claims then follow from the preceding theorem and W (x) = sup ®2A W ® (x).
Remark. Since W is convex, directional derivatives exist at all points and for all directions. 
Proof of the Representation
In this section we give the proof of Theorem 3.3. The proof that the di®eren-tial game has value (i.e., that V ¡ (x) = V + (x)) is deferred to the appendix. We¯rst prove some preparatory lemmas. Let By extracting a subsequence, we can assume that (½ m ; ¾ m ) ! (½ ¤ ; W ® (x)) with ½ ¤ 2 S. We claim that ½ ¤ 2 ½(x; ®). Indeed, we have
which proves that ½ ¤ 2 ½(x; ®), and shows that ½(x; ®) is nonempty. Since ½ ! F (½; ®) is linear, it follows that ½(x; ®) is also convex. To prove the upper semicontinuity we¯rst show that W ® (x) is jointly continuous in (x; ®). Let (x i ; ® i ) ! (x; ®) as i ! 1. Under Condition 3.1, for all " > 0 we can¯nd ½ 2 S such that
By extracting a subsequence, we can assume that W ® i (x i ) ! M and ½ i ! ½ 2 S. Taking the limit as i ! 1 in
and therefore lim inf i!1 W ® i (x i )¸W ® (x). We conclude that W ® (x) is jointly continuous in (x; ®). Next let (x i ; ® i ) ! (x; ®) as i ! 1, and let ½ i 2 ½(x i ; ® i ). We must show that ½ i ! ½ ¤ implies ½ ¤ 2 ½(x; ®). Using the continuity of W ® (x),
We conclude that ½ ¤ 2 ½(x; ®), and therefore (x; ®) ! ½(x; ®) is upper semicontinuous. 
The convexity of W then implies that for any a 2 (0; W (x))
It follows that
These are the velocities that are optimal (for the true controller) at x for the control problem W ® (x) for some ® 2 A. Proof: Suppose that v 2 F (½(x; ®); ®) for some ® 2 A. We know that
If v 2 C then we are done, since C is a cone with vertex at the origin. Now (8)
Proof: By Lemma 4.2 it is enough to show that y + W (y)q 2 C. According to the last lemma y + W (y)v 2 C, and so we can express (y=W (y)) + v as ¡
for some constants ¹ a i¸0 ; i = 1; :::; N . To prove
it is therefore enough to show that ¹ a i¸ai for i 2 I(x). (8) can be rewritten as
for j 2 I(x). Let M denote the cardinality of I(x). We recall that hd j ; e i i · 0 if i 6 = j and y i · x i · 0 for i 2 I(x). As a consequence, we can rewrite this system of M equations as
where I is the M £ M identity matrix, D M is non-negative with spectral radius less than 1, r j = a j ¡ ¹ a j for j 2 I(x), and q i = P j6 2I(x) ¹ a j hd j ; e i i + (y i =W (y)) · 0 for each i 2 I(x). Since each component of r = (
In the proof of Theorem 3.3 we will need to construct a nearly optimal strategy for the minimizing player to prove that V ¡ (x) · W (x). If W were smooth then such a strategy would be easy to construct. However, since W is only convex it must be molli¯ed to construct this policy, and this molli¯cation in turn complicates the construction of the optimal control on the boundary. In the lemma that follows we apply the previous lemma to deal with this issue.
Lemma 4.5 Assume that Conditions 2.1 and 3.1 are satis¯ed and de¯ne W (x) for x 2 IR N by (6) . Let°> 0 be given. Then there exists a convex, continuously di®erentiable and radially linear function W°:
and h¼(x; F (½; ®)); DW°(x)i · ¡(1 ¡°):
Proof: Fix°> 0. We begin by noting a relation between directional derivatives and subdi®erentials for convex functions. 
for all q 2 @W (x). We next mollify the function W . De¯ne the convex set G : = fx : W (x) · 1g. For a > 0 de¯ne the translation G a : = fy = x + a(1; :::; 1) : x 2 Gg, and for ± > 0 consider the ±¡fattening G ± a : = fy : ky ¡ xk · ± for some x 2 G a g. Since 0 2 G ± , we can assume without loss that a is small enough that the origin is contained in the interior of G ± a . As we will see, the translation is needed to ensure that the fattening does not interfere with the boundary conditions that are required of the molli¯cation. Finally, let
The construction is illustrated in Figure 7 . It is easy to check that W ± a is¯nite and convex. Also, it is well known that G ± a has a C 1 boundary for each ± > 0, and thus W ± a is continuously di®erentiable on IR N + nf0g. We¯rst compute the gradient of W ± a . Fix any point x 2 IR N + nf0g and let n be the outward normal to G ± a at y :
Since W ± a is radially linear the gradient of W ± a (x) must be proportional to n, which means there must be a supporting hyperplane of the form hx; rni to W ± a at x (here we use the fact that W ± a (0) = 0). Thus using the equality W ± a (x) = hx; rni, we¯nd that
Let y 0 be the unique point in G a that is exactly distance ± from y, and let z = y ¡ a(1; :::; 1). Then n is also an outward normal to G at z, and an analogous calculation to the one just given shows that for any point of the form bz, b 2 (0; 1), (1=hz; ni) n is a subdi®erential to W at bz. Therefore
where q is a subdi®erential to W at z. We can make jy ¡ zj as small as desired by choosing a > 0 and ± > 0 small. Let ½ 2 ½(x; ®). Since hy; ni is uniformly bounded from below away from zero, for all su±ciently small a > 0 and ± > 0 equation (11) implies
Observe that conditions (8) characterize ¼(x; F (½; ®)). Thus if we knew that z · y (componentwise) then
would also follow from Lemma 4.4. However, z · y follows easily by¯xing a > 0 and then choosing ± 2 (0; a). Finally, it is also easy to check that G and G ± a can be made arbitrarily close in the Hausdor® topology, which immediately implies
when a and ± are small. The lemma now follows by taking W°= W ± a for suitable a > 0 and ± > 0.
In the proof of Theorem 3.3 we will use a veri¯cation argument to show V ¡ (x) · W°(x) plus a small error. The use of feedback controls for the minimizing player would be problematic. The next lemma will allow the use of piecewise constant controls and thereby simplify the proof. The lemma is an immediate consequence of the continuity of DW°(x) for°> 0 and x 6 = 0. 
If ¿ x = 1 there is nothing to prove, and so we assume ¿ x < 1. Using the de¯nition of the Skorokhod Problem, there exist a i (t)¸0; i = 1; :::; N; t 2 [0;
Integrating over [0; ¿ x ] and using the de¯nition
for some ! 2 C, and so x + ¿ x F (¹ ½; ®) 2 C. The de¯nition of W ® (x) then implies ¿ x¸W® (x). Since µ[½](t) = ® is a legitimate strategy to use in the de¯nition of V + (x) and ½ 2 N is arbitrary, it follows that V + (x)¸W ® (x) for all ® 2 A. Taking the supremum on ® 2 A gives V + (x)¸W (x). We next prove W (x)¸V ¡ (x). Let°2 (0; 1=2), and let º > 0 be given according to Lemma 4.6. Fix x 2 IR d + n f0g and let the open loop control ® 2 M be given. We recursively construct a strategy ± 2 ¢ as follows. Given a point of the form x i 6 = 0 (with x 0 = x) and corresponding times ¿ i (with ¿ 0 = 0), we consider the normalized version z i = x i =kx i k. Let ½ ¤ (x; ®) be any single-valued and measurable selection from ½(x; ®). We de¯ne
Since the speed k _ Á(t)k is uniformly bounded from above, it is easy to check that infft¸¿ i : kÁ(t)=kÁ(t)k ¡ z i k¸ºg ¡ ¿ i is uniformly bounded away from zero if x i is in a closed set that does not contain the origin. We will make use of the fact that for any x 6 = 0 and any v ¼(x; v) = ¼(x=kxk; v). According to Lemma 4.6,
or almost every t prior to the¯rst time Á hits the origin, and therefore for all such times
We conclude that
and therefore Á reaches the origin by time W°(x)=(1 ¡ 2°): This implies
, and since°> 0 is arbitrary, that
Thus we have shown that
is based on a uniqueness result for the corresponding PDE, and is presented in the Appendix. This completes the proof of the theorem.
Synthesis of Controls
The \true" controls used to prove W (x)¸V ¡ (x) in the proof of Theorem 3.3 are not very useful, since they require knowledge of the control that nature applies at all times. In this section we will formally discuss how to construct controls that are optimal (or nearly optimal), and which depend only on the state of the network. A rigorous proof will appear elsewhere.
Formally, W = V ¡ = V + is the solution to the equation
together with the boundary conditions
Since F is a±ne in each variable seperately and A and S are compact and convex, [19, Corollary 37.6.2] implies that the sup and inf in (13) can be interchanged (i.e., one expects the game to have value). Since W is not necessarily smooth we cannot expect a classical sense solution to (13)- (14), and so one must consider a weak sense solution, e.g., viscosity solutions. Because W is convex, the set of subdi®erentials to W at x (denoted D ¡ W (x)) is never empty. It follows from the characterization of viscosity solutions (see the Appendix) that for any q 2 D ¡ W (x) there exists at least one saddle point (½(q); ®(q)) such that sup ®2A hq; F (½(q); ®)i · ¡1:
Let R(q) denote the set of all points ½ 2 S which have this property. It is easy to check that this set-valued function is upper semicontinuous: q n ! q, ½ n ! ½ and ½ n 2 R(q n ) implies ½ 2 R(q). At each point x 2 IR N + we de¯ne a set of controls S(x) ½ S by
Note that since x ! D ¡ W (x) and q ! R(q) are upper semicontinuous, so is the composition S(x), and that the radial linearity of W implies a radial homogeneity of S: S(ax) = S(x) for all x 2 IR N + and a 2 (0; 1). The set of conjectured controls for x in the interior is then S(x).
However, when on the boundary we must be more careful. As can easily be seen by considering two dimensional examples, there is an important distinction depending in whether the boundary condition holds in a classical sense or not. The following conjectures for the form of the optimal control are based on the analysis of two dimensional examples, and have not been veri¯ed in any generality. Let us¯rst consider the case of a point x where I(x) = i for a single value i. In this case the classical sense formulation of the boundary condition is hDW (x); d i i = 0. If this condition holds, it means that all optimally controlled trajectories push into the boundary, and that any selection from S(x) is optimal. If however hDW (x); d i i 6 = 0, then even if some elements from S(x) lead to trajectories that push into the boundary, we must restrict ourselves to only those for which the saddle point dynamics do not push strictly into the boundary. If the boundary condition is not valid in the classical sense, then we conjecture that this set is always nonempty. Analogous considerations hold for the points at the intersection of two or more faces. In general, choosing a control for which the saddle point dynamics push into a face is only allowed when the corresponding boundary condition holds in the classical sense.
Appendix
In this appendix we will prove that the game has value, i.e., that V + (x) = V ¡ (x) for all x 2 IR N + . A key ingredient is a uniqueness result for the partial di®erential equation (PDE) that V + and V ¡ should satisfy. An excellent general reference for the theory of viscosity solutions of¯rst order nonlinear PDE is the book [2] . The particular results we will need can be found in [1] (see also [9] ).
For q 2 IR N de¯ne
where the two expressions on the right hand side are equal since F (½; ®) is a±ne in each variable separately and S and A are convex and compact. Consider a Lipschitz continuous function V : IR N + ! IR, and for a continuously di®erentiable function g : IR N ! IR let y be a local maximum (respectively, minimum) of
Then V is called a viscosity subsolution (respectively, viscosity supersolution) to (13) and (14) if
We henceforth drop the adjective \viscosity," and note that a function that is both a sub and supersolution is called a solution. Chapter VIII]). Thus V + = V ¡ will follow if we can prove that (ii) and (iii) hold for both V + and V ¡ .
Assume for now that V + is uniformly bounded on bounded sets. It follows from Theorem 3.3 that 0 · V ¡ (x) · V + (x) · 1. It is also immediate from the de¯nitions that both V + (x) and V ¡ (x) are radially linear, and that V + (x)^V ¡ (x) > 0 for x 2 (IR N + )nf0g. Thus if V + is uniformly bounded on bounded sets, all that needs to be shown is that V + and V ¡ are Lipschitz continuous. We give the proof for V + , and note that the proof for V ¡ is analogous. Let M : = max y:kyk=1 V + (y), and assume for now that M < 1. Owing to the radial linearity, V + (x) · M kxk. Fix points x; y 2 IR N + and " > 0. Let K < 1 be the Lipschitz constant of the Skorokhod Map de¯ned in Section 2. We claim that V + is Lipschitz continuous with constant M K. The proof adapts a standard argument [2] . . If we let Á x (t) and Á y (t) denote the processes started at the points x and y, then the Lipschitz property of the Skorokhod Map implies kÁ x (¾) ¡ Á y (¾)k · Kkx ¡ yk. Since Á y (¾) = 0, this means that kÁ x (¾)k · Kkx ¡ yk. We can now use dynamic programming to argue that V + (x) · ¾ + V + (Á x (¾)) + "=2 · ¾ + M Kkx ¡ yk + "=2, and thus V + (x) ¡ V + (y) · M Kkx ¡ yk + ". Combining the two cases and using that " > 0 is arbitrary, it follows that V + (x) ¡ V + (y) · M Kkx ¡ yk for all x; y 2 IR N + . With the proof that V + and V ¡ are Lipschitz continuous complete, all that remains is to prove that V + is uniformly bounded on bounded sets. Under Condition 2.1, it was shown in [8, Lemma 2.1, Theorem 2.1, and page 60] that there is a compact, convex set B ½ IR N with the following properties:
>From the convexity, properties 1 and 2 listed above, and the smoothness of @B, it follows that R is continuously di®erentiable save at x = 0, and that for x 2 IR 
Now¯x any point x 2 IR N + nf0g, and let z 2 @B satisfy z = ax for some a 2 (0; 1). If n is the corresponding outward normal to B at z, then DR(x) = bn for some b 2 (0; 1). According to properties 2 and 3 above, 
Finally, the radial linearity of R, the continuity of DR(x), and another open covering argument that uses the compactness of @B \ IR N + shows that c > 0 can be selected so that (19) holds for all x 2 IR N + nf0g. Equations (18) and (19) imply that R=c is a (classical) supersolution to (13) and (14) . Standard arguments based on dynamic programming can then be used to show that V + (x) · R(x)=c. (See, for example, the proof of Theorem 3.3.) This completes the proof that V + (x) = V ¡ (x) for all x 2 IR N + .
